9-11 and the Re-focusing of International Society

international societyBy Ian Howarth

The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 (9-11) represented a shift in the nature of international society from one based largely on economic interests to one based on notions of international security. As such 9-11 represented the most significant shake up in international relations since the end of the Cold War, acting as a massive catalyst for change in how international society is perceived by the developed world.

What do we mean by international society?  One simple definition of the concept given by Hedley Bull is that ‘a society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions’ (Evans, & Newnham, 1998: 276).  Furthermore, international society is founded according to English school theorists such as Bull and Manning on ‘four key pillars international law, diplomacy, international organisations and the balance of power’ (Evans, & Newnham: 276), these four key pillars determine all the relationships between nations, and form modern international society, with the United Nations (UN), NATO and financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) representing common values and goals, and the security council representing the balance of power and implementing international law.

I do not believe international society was ever irrelevant, but that the events of 9-11 dramatically changed the nature of international society in the world, from the economic institutionally based form of international society of the 1990’s based largely around the common goals of the developed world in furthering globalisation, to a form of international society that is based on the need for global action against international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Therefore in order to demonstrate this change in the nature and focus of the international community, I am going to explore the nature of international society before and after 9-11, and use the above definition to determine whether the ‘war against terror’ represents unilateralist actions by the world’s only superpower.  Or is it a combined effort by a majority of the world’s nations to combat a serious issue that threatens the security of all nations, and therefore the express will of international society.

The 1990’s were a decade of contrasts; they began full of hope and ended in many respects on 9-11 with terror and destruction in New York, Washington and a cornfield in Pensylvannia.  The hope that the decade began with was premised on the end of the cold war.  The collapse of the USSR was proceeded with the emancipation of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and followed by the end of apartheid in South Africa, the liberation of Kuwait and George Bush (the elders) declaration of a ‘New World Order’ (Calvocoressi 2001: 67) with the three policemen the United Kingdom, France and primarily the United States ensuring freedom, prosperity and an end to tyranny and fear, all under the umbrella of the UN, IMF and other major international institutions, it seemed to represent a new era of more conciliatory international politics, based more on transnational interests compared to the old confrontational style of the cold war or the gunboat diplomacy of the age of empires.

To a certain extent this is what happened, but only for us fortunate few that lived in the developed world.  While the list of troubles facing the ‘west’ were shortened everyday with remarkable speed and twists in the course of history, the developing world where 80% of the human race lived failed to benefit from these geopolitical shifts in any significant way.  The proxy wars continued in Angola, and Algeria, only without their sponsors they were pretty much forgotten by the west.  Famine was still a continuing threat throughout sub-Saharan Africa, western corporate exploitation rose to new levels in South East Asia, and Islamic extremism let loose from its cold war bonds spread rapidly and brought down governments in Somalia and Afghanistan.

Within a short three years of George Bush’s declaration of the ‘New World Order’, there was a new order but it wasn’t what many had hoped for, the new order was not one based on international law, and human rights, but on economic imperatives and globalisation.  The new nature of international society was economics, profit and free trade.  Therefore when war broke out in the Balkans and there was genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, where were the policemen? The truth is that the west was more interested in economic interventions that could reap rewards, than costly military adventures in the Balkans.

Politicians and diplomats were more concerned with globalisation than genocide; the cry of the time was, emerging economies, Asian tigers, free markets, free movement of our people, and unlimited access to their resources, and was followed by, the digital revolution, dot-com millionaires, mobile phones, soaring stock markets, and budget airlines, the developed world had never had it so good.

In short two international societies emerged after the Cold War, a western developed international society based on the ideals of commerce and free trade, and an international society of the undeveloped world seeking aid and access to the global market, with World Trade Organization membership becoming the golden ticket, the way to move from one world to the other.  International society we began to believe was globalisation, the creation of a world market is for the benefit of all humanity.  The truth is that throughout the 1990’s we in the developed world where the money’s made and the decisions taken ignored 80% of our fellow man who continued to live in poverty, we pretended not to see the ‘1.3 billion human beings that live on less than a dollar a day’ (Australian Agency for International Development 13/11/2002), we ignored the fact that most of these Asian tigers were ruled by maniac dictators, and we ignored the fact that Saddam Hussein continued his rule and persecution in Iraq, and that India and Pakistan had gone nuclear without a blink from us, we comforted ourselves with talk of peace in northern Ireland and Israel, and of the debt limitation talks being held with western client country’s such as Morocco, and Indonesia.

My argument has been that the 1990’s despite their talk of a Global Village were a period where many of the real issues within international society were ignored, at the expense of a rich man’s club of wealthy nations and their wealthy citizens, it was a smoke screen, an illusion that we all believed and for a while it worked.  It was occasionally threatened by reality, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania carried out by Al’ Queda for example, but after we’d blown up a deserted camp in Afghanistan and a Medicine factory in the Sudan we all felt better and carried on regardless.  However what 9-11 did was smash the screen and gate crash the party, we suddenly became aware of the rest of the world and the sorry state it was in.  We all watched our televisions stunned as the greatest nation on earth was sent into turmoil by four hijacked commercial airliners, and every one of us felt a cold shiver run down our spines, because we knew then what it all meant, the world was about to change, the good times were over.

Immediately after 9-11 George W. Bush declared a War against Terrorism, an international effort to eradicate Al’ Queda and international terrorism in general, that soon spread to focusing on the ‘axis of evil’ and WMD, in short the focus of the developed world shifted from the primarily economic drives of the 1990’s and moved to issues of international security.  Therefore, I reiterate my argument international society was relevant before 9-11 and still is, it has simply re-focused its attention and changed its priorities after a decade of neglecting the world outside it’s privileged borders.

At the time of this change the then British prime minister Tony Blair stated his belief in the importance of international society during a speech given at the Lord mayors banquet in London, he stated that “The interdependence of the modern world has never been clearer; the need for a common response never greater; the values of freedom, justice and tolerance of our diversity never more relevant; and the need to apply them fairly across the world never more urgent.” (Blair, Tony 2002).  This was a clear statement of the relevance of international society, from one of the early leaders of that new world order.

Initially this new approach saw the formation of what George W. Bush called a ‘coalition of the willing’ outside international organisations such as the UN or the IMF. However,  this coalition soon created its own legitimacy through its sheer size, and representation within international organizations, incorporating the war against terror into the agendas of organisations such as the UN (peacekeepers in Afghanistan) and the IMF, World Bank and the European Union.  Through such initiatives as tracking down bank accounts and freezing the financial assets of terrorists and their sponsors, and increasing pressure on other sources of income for terrorist organisations, such as human, and drug trafficking. In fact the irony here is that the process of globalisation that had so occupied the actions of the developed world for the past decade, proved useful in that as Thomas Biersteker states ‘the ease with which transnational actors can move funds across borders in the wake of financial market globalisation also has contradictory aspects, for the same technology that enables rapid movements of funds also enables enhanced surveillance and the possibility of tracking those funds…. global terrorism is a networked threat that invites a networked response, and the technology….is available’ (Booth & Dunne 2002: 76)

The actions of the United States since 9-11 were within the definitions of international society, for example in its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan it organised a multi-national coalition of nations from the developed and developing world, including Islamic states, all with a common goal the destruction of Al’Qaeda and the Taliban.  It also took part in the formation of a post-Taliban government for Afghanistan with an international conference in Bonn and then the formation of an international stabilisation force for Kabul under the auspices of the UN and later NATO.  Since Afghanistan the USA and its allies within this new international society have used the instruments of this society to continue their war on terror and the battle against the ‘axis of evil’.

9-11 was a terrible event, 3056 (BBC News 2003) innocent people were killed by a band of religious fanatics, but on a daily basis more than that die from hunger, and curable disease, there is an Aids pandemic in Africa that threatens to bring anarchy to the continent, as it’s young are wiped out and its healthy population dwindles.  These are the underlying causes of 9-11, poverty, lack of hope, lack of a voice; only hopeless desperate people blow themselves up or fly into buildings.

The War on Terror, and the subsequent attack on the ‘axis of evil’ has in many ways created a new false illusion of security by ignoring the major underlying causes of 9-11.  Despite the progress in the war on terror, and the attempts to confront WMD and particularly nuclear proliferation, issues that were neglected throughout the 1990’s.  There is a lot that the international community is not doing, it is not confronting and dealing with the continuing and increasing bloodshed in Palestine, nor with global poverty, or with bad governance in the developing world.  In short we have begun to tackle some of the world’s major problems, but mostly we are attacking the symptoms and not dealing with the causes.  Corrupt oppressive regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan and Cambodia continue to gain western support despite their unquestionable involvements with international terrorism and the oppression of their own people.  The recent coup and collapse of the experiment in Islamic democracy in Egypt and the failure of the USA and other powers to truly condemn the military takeover is further evidence of the wests lack of dedication to the eradication of the root causes of international security concerns. Instead the west favours dealing in expediency and easy answers through the further oppression of an entire people.

International Society like our domestic societies contain the have and the have not’s, and in order to tackle the issues of international security in this new world order what the developed world really needs to do is spend a little money, for example at the start of the war on terror the ‘combined budgets of the Pentagon in 2001 was $1.6 trillion’ (Moore 2001: 170), that was an enormous amount money, yet every penny of it went on bombs, aircraft carriers and the biggest military machine the world had ever seen..  A fraction of that money could bring clean water and decent health care to the whole of the developing world, in fact it could have made the Marshall Plan look like a drop in the ocean if we had wanted it too. Imagine just for a moment what the whole of the developed world could do if it put its mind and wallet into it, a worldwide action plan to eradicate starvation, or bring decent education and health facilities to the majority of the world’s people.

The relevance of International Society has never been clearer; the problems that effect one nation and people soon spill over in an endless cycle of unforeseen consequences that can impact every one of us.  The failure of a government to provide for its citizens should be of the upmost concern to every other government.  The helplessness and despair that failed corrupt and/or autocratic regimes fosters only leads to violent unpredictable reactions.  This is the root of terrorism, and tackling this above all else is the sole true solution to creating a stable and secure international society for all humanity.

Bibliography:

Australian Agency for International Development accessed through the World Bank Group’s PovertyNet – Webguide – Bilateral Development Agencies: http://poverty.worldbank.org/webguide/category/3

BBC News Website http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/september11

Blair, Tony; Speech to the Lord Mayors Banquet, 11th November 2002 http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page6534.asp

Booth, Ken and Dunne, Tim (2002) ‘Worlds in Collision Terror and the Future of Global Order’ Palgrave, Basingstoke, England, p76

Calvocoressi, Peter (2001) ‘World Politics 1945 – 2000’ Longman, Harlow, England p67

Evans, Graham, and Newnham, Jeffrey (1998) ‘The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations’ Penguin Books, London p276-277

Moore, Michael (2001) ‘Stupid White Men’ Penguin Books, London p168, 170

Stern, Geoffrey (2000)‘The Structure of International Society’ 2nd Edition, Pinter, London

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The United Nations; 65 Years of Success or Failure?

un fightBy Ian Howarth

The preamble of the founding Charter of the United Nations (1945) sets out its principles, and its norms, and as such is probably the fairest way by which to judge the organisations success or failure.

‘WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

  • to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
  • to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
  • to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
  • to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

  • to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
  • to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
  • to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
  • to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

(UN Charter, San Francisco, 26th June 1945)

The basic structure of the United Nations (UN) consists of three key components, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary General’s Office.  The General Assembly is the body where all member states have a seat and a vote on resolutions placed by the various member states before the Assembly. Here resolutions are passed by a simple majority.  In the case of the admittance of new members or matters of great importance such as peace and security a two thirds majority is required.’ However, the decisions of the General Assembly are not legally binding on the member states and their enforcement relies on the moral weight of the UN and world opinion.

The Security Council is made up of fifteen member states, five permanent members, China, United States, United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation which represent the great power relationships as they stood at the UN’s foundation, and ten member states elected by the General Assembly for two year terms.  Currently the ten elected seats are held by, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda and Togo.  The Security Council is the power wielding institution of the UN, the five permanent members each hold the ability to veto any motion placed before the council, (the ten elected members do not have a veto). Resolutions adopted by the Council are legally binding on all the member states, and the Council has the powers to enforce its resolutions through economic sanctions or even military action.  The Security Council is the body within international relations that grants legitimacy or otherwise to the actions of its member states.

The successes and failures of the UN can be measured against the achievements or otherwise of its founding principles and norms, the fundamental one being that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest”. In short the UN was established by the victors of the Second World War to prevent another world war, which became a more urgent endeavour in the fresh glow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is apparent that the UN has failed to bring about world peace and end all war.  However, it would be wrong to conclude that due to this the organization is a failure.  There are gradients of success and failure and when one looks at the broad scope of the post-war period up to the present there are clear initiatives taken by the UN that have averted armed conflict and brought the aggressors to the bargaining table.  There are also periods over the last 57 years when the UN has failed miserably in its responsibilities under its founding charter, and in the next few paragraphs I shall highlight and explore these failures and successes and attempt to form a judgment on the performance of this regime.

The failures of the UN are unfortunately more numerous than its achievements, incidents in which the UN failed to intervene include Vietnam (1954-1973), Afghanistan (1979-1989), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), East Timor (1978) Rwanda (1995), the Invasion of Iraq (2003) and the current on-going bloody civil war in Syria to name but a few.  The first incident that I am going to highlight is the Budapest uprising of 1956 and the Prague Spring (1968), during which Hungary and Czechoslovakia both nations that had been under Soviet domination since 1945 briefly regained their independence, before the Soviet tanks rolled in and quashed the uprisings.  The failure here of the United Nations highlighted the true measure of its powers within the cold war bipolar system.  The USSR and the USA had both agreed spheres of influence, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia lay well within the Soviet sphere, consequently the UN was handicapped to intervene on the principle of self-determination set out in its charter due to the veto powers of the Security Council.  This incident just went to further highlight the power that the superpowers held over the UN and their manipulation of the UN in their continuing cold war.

The above example also highlights the way in which the decision making processes of the UN can and often do prevent the UN from being a more pro-active force in international relations.  The powers held by the permanent members of the Security Council mean that the interests of these members can never be placed under the scrutiny of the General Assembly or the Secretary General.

Another failure of great significance is Rwanda in 1995; this is significant due to the fact that the Cold War was over.  The failure in this case was entirely down to a lack of leadership and an inability by the UN to galvanize the necessary support from the western member states in order to send in an intervention force, consequently the world looked on as hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were massacred by their Hutu neighbours in a demonstration of ethnic cleansing not seen since Stalin’s purges.  This humanitarian disaster was symptomatic of the failures of the UN throughout the 1990’s.  Srebrenica in the same year as the Rwanda genocide saw ‘7000 Bosnian Muslim’s’ (Calvocoressi; 2001) massacred in the worst genocide in Europe since the end of the Second World War.  In both instances the UN failed to intervene in time, and in the case of Srebrenica the Dutch UN peacekeepers watched on as thousands were taken from the UN enclave and murdered.

These incidents only went to highlight the inability of the UN to operate without the support of its member states and primarily the Security Council.  The weak mandate in Bosnia led to the appalling events of Srebrenica and no mandate at all led to genocide in Rwanda.

In short the failures of the UN since its inception can be placed into two categories; those that were related to the cold war power plays of the Superpowers e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola etc. This meant the Security Council was never going to intervene with both the United States and the Soviet Union holding a veto.  And those that were down to poor leadership and a lack of political will, such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and East Timor (1978).

However despite the indications above to the contrary the UN has recorded a number of successes, which include Korea (1950-1952) East Timor (1999-2002), Persian Gulf (1991) Cyprus (1972- Present), Congo (1960-1964) Sierra Leone (1998) Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).

The first significant and arguably successful intervention under UN auspices after its foundation was the Korean War.  The UN largely under American pressure landed a massive coalition force on the Korean peninsula in order to preserve South Korean independence in the face of North Korean aggression.  However, despite the failure as the United States considers it to defeat the North Koreans the UN did succeed in re-establishing the pre-war status quo on the peninsula a situation which remains to this day.  However the success in Korea was the first indication of the nature of the relationship between Washington and the UN in New York.  The United States was intent on using the UN to further its fight against communism and exacerbate attempts by the UN to intervene in proxy wars across the world e.g. Angola, El Salvador.

Despite the UN’s failure to intervene when Indonesia invaded East Timor shortly after its independence from the Dutch in 1978 the UN intervention to preserve East Timorese self-determination in the wake of a wave of violence following the referendum on independence in September 2000 was an overwhelming success.  Although the majority of UN forces arrived a month late on the ground it clearly prevented a more serious incident and directly led to the independence of East Timor from Indonesia in 2002.  Sierra Leone also represents an achievement by the UN although a lot less resounding than East Timor, the UN force in Sierra Leone initially faced a lot of pressure due to a weak mandate and an insufficient number of troops.  However, after the UN supported British intervention in 2000/2001 to re-enforce the UN mission and the adoption of a more robust mandate a final resolution to that nation’s decade long conflict between the government and rebel forces was secured.  A UN intervention in Angola has also brought about a settlement after 30 years of war.

The Persian Gulf War was also a significant UN achievement.  The coalition force that was assembled during operation Desert Shield in late 1990 and early 1991 was done so under a Security Council resolution.  The defeat of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of Kuwait was a resounding success, which brought about great hopes for future UN intervention’s which were later dashed by the incidents in Bosnia and elsewhere. The implementation of sanctions against Iraq by the UN was also initially a success, with an estimated 85% of Iraq’s biological weapons stockpiles being destroyed, and the entire nuclear weapon development programme being shut down.  However, later events that led up to the US/UK led invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked one of the UNs lowest points in its sixty years of history.  The divisions that opened up in the Security Council before and during that period were far greater than at any time since the Cold War, and utterly paralysed the UN as an actor in the ensuing conflict.

Other areas of the world that UN intervention has brought about positive results include Ethiopia and Eritrea.  The Congo in the early 1960’s almost bankrupted the UN and led to heavy casualties amongst the UN Force but it did succeed in ending the civil war and re-uniting the Congo.  It was the first UN led intervention within a member state, something the charter forbade.  The lessons of this intervention also partly explain the reluctance within the UN to intervene in conflicts within member states such as Bosnia, and Rwanda, as well as the on-going war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Despite the UNs failure to end war and its significant and numerous failures, the organisation has brought about change for the good, and remains the primary force for conflict resolution and international cooperation.  The existence of rival institutions such as NATO which also aims to promote global security has weakened the ability of the UN.  However, significantly there has so far been no third world war.  It is arguable that the institutional framework of the UN provided the superpowers with a vital non-violent means to confront and discuss issues in a formal environment within which each felt equally legitimate and non-threatened.  It is important to note that up until Gorbachev’s détente of the late 1980’s there was no regular contact between the Soviet Union and the USA, and therefore without the contact that the UN provided, misunderstandings could have grown into something much more serious.

The UN was established primarily to prevent a third world war and provide conflicting parties a means by which to meet and negotiate.  Within the terms of that ambition this regime has so far succeeded.  Furthermore, its norms and principles have been accepted by all the member states and although not yet implemented by all, the fundamental ideal of human rights, and meaningful discussion rather than war has gained ground and greater acceptance throughout the world. +

Bibliography:

Calvocoressi, Peter (2001) ‘World Politics 1945-2000’ p346-347 Longman: Harlow England p235, 237

Krasner, Stephen (1983) ‘International Regimes’ p2, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: New York.

Stern, Geoffrey (2000) ‘The Structure of International Society’ 2nd Edition, p237, Pinter: London

http://www.un.org

US Foreign Policy and Israel

By Ian Howarth

The United Sates has to play a difficult balancing act with its policy in the Middle East, on the one hand it supports the state of Israel and guarantee’s its national integrity, and on the other is its reliance on Oil, and Arab demands for action on the question of Palestine.  This balancing act has over the decades since Israeli independence not always been successful, with the USA at times finding itself forced by Israeli unilateral actions into opposing Arab states and suffering economic catastrophes as a result.  The nature of the complex relationship between the State of Israel and the United States can be examined through four key issues that present US policy-makers with significant obstacles when trying to influence Israeli policy.President Barack Obama meets Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations in New York

1, American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)

2, Congress and American Politics

3, US Financial and Military Aid

4, Democracy and Shared Values

The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC):

There has been much written and discussed about the power and influence of what is sometimes called the ‘Jewish Lobby’ in Washington and as such its role in formulating US policy towards Israel.  Despite the numerically small number of Jewish Americans (although the 6 million living in the United Sates is the largest population outside of Israel, with the largest concentration in New York) AIPAC has been very successful in lobbying the United States Congress and in maintaining a strong level of support for the State of Israel amongst the American public.

The question of Israeli-Arab relations becomes a key debate in almost all electoral processes within the United States, with candidates that present positions contrary to those of AIPAC receiving strong condemnation and ridicule in the press, as well as suffering from difficulties in raising the all-important cash that keeps the US political system ticking.

In every American presidential election campaign since 1948 all the major candidates seeking nominations from both the Republican and the Democratic Parties have stated that they are true friends of the Jewish people and would be staunch allies of Israel in office.  In return for the favourable positions taken by US Presidents towards Israel, AIPAC donates vast quantities of money to their campaigns, and to ensure a guaranteed pro-Israeli president it backs both horses in the race ensuring itself a voice in the next administration.

AIPAC has been and remains the most powerful of Washington lobby groups, guaranteeing positions for its supporters within the key cabinet departments with direct policy control over Middle Eastern affairs.  Despite the obviously sinister undertones of the concepts of powerful back room lobbies forcing policy decisions on the back of a cheque book, AIPAC is not an illegal organisation, nor does it act illegally but works entirely within the tenets of the American political system.

The key difference between itself and all the other lobby groups is that it has been so successful, and more importantly its successes lie in a distinct and controversial area of American policy with the rest of the world.  Whereas the energy and tobacco lobbies have less of a public profile, yet have in their own measure the same types of influence on the Oval Office in their policy areas.  AIPAC has maintained itself in a strong position within American politics by remaining consistent, and outside of issues of domestic controversy, focusing its efforts on maintaining the worlds superpower as Israel’s friend. It hasn’t mistakenly aligned itself to one candidate over another and as such lost influence in an unfavourable outcome.  It constantly bombards American public opinion with pro –Israeli positions, and gains the endorsement of almost all major American politicians whether they are Republican or Democrat, and flirts with celebrity and Hollywood, fashion and academia, all of which in effect has meant that Israel as a concept has become as American as Apple Pie.

Congress and American Politics:

It is the Senate that holds the keys to American foreign policy, any treaty the President signs on behalf of the United States must be endorsed by the US Senate, if not the treaty is null and void, e.g. Kyoto, and the League of Nations.  The Senate with the House of Representatives hold sway over almost every aspect of US domestic policy, and any presidential initiative on health, social welfare or education must pass the House of Representatives, and any appointments to the Presidential Cabinet, the Joint Chief’s, and the Supreme Court must pass Senate Committee Approval.

The United States system of government is premised on the ‘Balance of Power’ so that effectively no one person can do anything without the support of significant factions within each and every stage of the American government.   Therefore if an American President were to announce a radical change in direction regarding US policy towards Israel, it would require majorities in all the key positions of power within the United States.

Furthermore the biggest stick with which the President could beat an Israeli Government into touch with, is in fact not under his direct control, but that of Congress. The ‘$5 billion’ (Said 1995: XXIV) a year in loans and armaments that the United States grants the Israeli government at such favourable rates that they almost meet the criteria of grants.  Therefore the composition of the Congress is essential in setting US policy in the Middle East, and as such AIPAC is at its most effective in this arena, supporting almost every candidate to the House and the Senate, and opposing those who they don’t.  This has meant that there has been a pro-Israeli majority in both Houses since Israel’s independence.

AIPAC can therefore ensure that if the Presidency were to take what they would deem to be an anti-Israeli position they could pull the financial strings in congress and disrupt the full spectrum of presidential initiatives currently in the House, meaning that the AIPAC could in effect bring down for example a new Health Bill if the White House was unresponsive to its position.  This is really hardball politics, and although it seems underhanded it’s how all politics is effectively done in America.  It is therefore arguable that the American system of government is systemically adverse to major policy changes, or reforms, as the majorities required to bring about such change are so large.

US Financial and Military Aid:

The amount of financial assistance the United States provides Israel with both financially and militarily is significant, amounting to around ‘$5 billion dollars a year’. (Said 1995: XXIV)  The terms of this assistance are such that it is effectively a grant, with no set repayment schedule, and no tough enforcement of interest re-payments, with Israel having the latitude to defer payments on its loans for as long as it deems necessary in the name of national security.  Aside from this yearly dose of cash Israel also benefits from effectively being a military outpost of the United States in time of conflict.  For example during the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), the United States under US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s direction ‘moved the carrier USS Independence and three destroyers to within 500 miles of the Israeli coast’ (Paterson & Merrill 1982: 682) in order to provide air defence should Israel come under attack. 

Furthermore during the same conflict while Kissinger directed the United States within the United Nations to push for a cease-fire, with itself as the mediator negotiating with Egypt, it conducted a secret re-enforcement of Israeli forces, with American tanks, planes, and sophisticated weapons.  The ‘US Congress passed emergency legislation that provided Israel with $2.2 billion dollars to pay for these weapons’ (Paterson & Merrill 1989: 683).  This amount marked a watershed in US-Israeli relations in both terms of cash amount, and the qualitative cost of the new weapons with the ‘Pentagon estimating that $850 million’ (Paterson & Merrill 1989: 683) was sufficient to cover the cost of the weapons.  ‘Spokesmen for the [Nixon] administration were unable to tell Congress exactly how $1 billion of the total $2.2 billion would be used, though Congress, in its zeal to demonstrate support for Israel, was apparently not disturbed by this lack of information.  Moreover $1.5 billion of the total $2.2. billion was to be an outright grant, entailing no repayment.  Kissinger is said to have argued for even more-at $3 billion and all in outright grants…’ (Patterson & Merril1989: 683)

The financial and military assistance provided by the United States is therefore a major consideration in any discussion amongst American foreign policy makers as it provides the potential for enormous leverage over Israeli policy. While at the same time it equally ties the United States to the fundamentals of maintaining Israel’s security.

Democracy and Shared Values:

Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East and in many American eyes that is all that counts when it comes to dictating US support for Israel. Although in essence this is true, Israel is not a Liberal Democracy.  Arab Israelis live in a form of political segregation with limitations on their rights of representation, as a result of Zionist fears of Arabs seizing the state from within.  There is a total lack of Palestinian representation within the Israeli political system; this is despite its forty six year occupation of the Palestinian territories.  Israel has made no attempt to integrate any part of Palestinian society with its own, preferring to force Palestinians off their land replacing them with Israeli settlers as a means of integrating the West Bank and Gaza into Israel proper.

The position Israel holds as the closest thing to a democracy in the region has been an essential factor in US relations with Israel, even when US Presidents have taken a harsher tone with Israel in the end they are forced by the stark conflict between Arab absolutism and terrorism and Israeli democracy.  America after all is the land of the free, and the leader of the free world, and to take a position that failed to recognise the legitimacy of the Israeli states democracy in the face of the Arab world’s monarchs and dictators would be to invite a domestic political crisis.

Ultimately Israel has benefited far more than the USA in this relationship, the ties that bind the USA to Israel are so great that it is inconceivable for a US President to force an Israeli Prime-Minister into a position that they don’t support.  This is despite the fact that Israel’s national security is wholly dependent on the financial and military aid and guarantees of the United States.

This statement is proven in my opinion by Israel’s pre-emptive actions against Lebanon, Iraq, and in the 1968 War, when Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt, and Syria, seizing the Sinai, and the Golan Heights with limited prior consultation with the USA. This action despite the US’s objection to the policy was ultimately fully endorsed by the United States, who provided critical international diplomatic cover in the UN Security Council.  It was the use of the United States’ veto at the Security Council that gave Israel the necessary time to encircle the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai, before the enforcement of the cease fire.

In fact the Israeli army continued with hostilities against the Egyptians for forty-eight hours after the cease fire came into force.  This action was completed covertly under the cover of Secretary of State Kissinger’s claim that the Israeli forces were merely taking up defensive positions, when in fact they were securing the complete encirclement of the Third Army, an action led by Ariel Sharon as a senior Israeli tank commander, Sharon wanted to annihilate the 3rd Army.  However Kissinger managed to bring about his only piece of decisive intervention in the Israeli plans by persuading Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that such an action would cripple Nasser’s military regime and lead to the collapse of Egypt into civil strife.  This would have created a situation that would be highly hazardous on Israel’s borders, and ultimately prevent Israel’s ambition of a negotiated peace with Egypt, that recognised the state of Israel, and fractured the Arab alliance set against them.  This US involvement on the side of Israel in the 1968 War was to its strategic disadvantage leading to the first OPEC Oil embargo, and a worldwide economic recession.  Israel on the other hand secured the military defeat of Egypt and Syria, and made substantial territorial gains.

Case Study: The Oslo Peace Process 1993 – 2000

The Oslo Peace process is in my opinion the best example of the difficulties faced by the United States in influencing Israeli policy in the Middle East and in particular in effecting a just settlement for the Palestinian people.  President Clinton was at first not a particularly promising prospect for the world when it came to American involvement in international affairs.  One of his very first actions as President was a unilateral US withdrawal from Somalia, an action that left the country in an arguably worst state than that which the action had aimed to remedy.  There was also dithering over Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti. Therefore when months of secret negotiations between two Israeli academics and members of the PLO were revealed and given US support in 1993, and the land for peace agenda was agreed by Arafat, and Rabin in the signing of the accord in the Rose Garden before the worlds press, with ‘that’ handshake, it was something of a dramatic breakthrough in American Israeli relations, with America apparently actively pushing Israeli into finding a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question.

However this was from the start a farce, Oslo took ‘the peace steam-roller… [Into]… a new, and much more destructive phase.  Far from bringing peace, it brought greater suffering for Palestinians, and assured harm to the long term interests of the Israelis as a people.’ (Said 1995: 146-147)   The entire proposition of the Oslo peace process that of land for peace was flawed in its inception; the land that Israel wished to trade with the PLO was not it’s to trade.  In essence for Israel to trade the land required the tacit acceptance of the Palestinians and the PLO of the Occupation, a condition that has never been conceded by any national liberation movement to a military occupation.

This is effectively what occurred with the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on the White House Lawn on that September afternoon, it was the first steps in the creation of what Christopher Hutchens in his foreword to Edward Said’s book ‘Peace and Its Discontents’ refers to as a ‘refugee state’, wholly dependent on Israel for security and access to world trade. Palestine was not to become a state for the Palestinians, its fractured borders, potted with Israeli settlements, it would be a decapitated territory joined together by a narrow ‘international road’ linking the Gaza strip with what’s left of the West Bank.  This would have created an unsustainable political entity crippled by economic weakness, lacking any sense of unified identity, and ultimately unable to act as a sovereign power in the defining areas of defence and security with the Israeli Defence Force being the only military entity allowed to operate within the area. This was not a Palestinian State, it was a humiliation and ultimately was destined to only increase the sense of hopelessness and bloodshed, and Oslo in its deceit was the foundation stone of the second intifada, and the eventual rise of Hamas to power in the Gaza Strip.

Oslo was about the ambitions of two men, Rabin and his dream of secure Israeli borders with the subjugation of Palestinian and Arab hostility through a botched and uneven peace, and Arafat a man who cared more about being called Mr President than the suffering of his own people.  This was only compounded by the grand standing ambitions of America’s first diplomat.  Clinton saw Oslo as a route out of the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire that could be accepted by Arab States.  The goal being  Arab Oil, by removing the instability the Palestinian issue provided within Americas strategic and contradictory interests within the region, that of Israel’s guarantor and Americas reliance on Arab Oil.

The reason why I have highlighted Oslo as an example of Israeli influence over US policy rather than vice versa, is that the simple solution to Americas contradictory positions within the region is the pro-active engagement with Israel on the status of the ‘occupied territories’ from the position of UN Resolutions 242, and 337 ‘which state that no state can hold on to territory taken by force’, such an approach would secure Arab Oil, yet maintain Israeli security.  However it would not fulfil Zionist territorial ambition and the desire amongst some sectors of Israel’s political establishment to see the Palestinians utterly defeated before any peace, as if 46 years of occupation hasn’t been enough.

However the United States shunted the UN aside and began negotiations from the basis of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Israeli property with which to negotiate and to also negotiate the existence of Israeli settlements, vast hilltop fortresses that occupy strategic advantages, and dominate the land around, no state could countenance such a situation.  Yet Arafat in his own self-obsessed egotism signed away a key position in 1993, a position set out in ‘The Palestinian National Covenant’ (1968) ‘The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and when the liberation of its homeland is complete it will exercise self-determination solely according to its own will and choice.’ (Paterson & Merrill 1989: 641)   Two equal states with mutual respect for each other, was about to be sacrificed for what the Zionists have determined to be the most achievable outcome of a Greater Israel and a dependent gutted and broken Palestine.

The failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 have often been described as the result of Yasser Arafat’s intractability, however in the context of what I have just described his failure to reach agreement with prime minister Barak was due to his realisation that the peace process was no longer washing with his public, he sensed the coming storm and decided not to be at sea when it came.  The rapid descent into violence and it’s ferocity as well as actions taken by the right wing anti-agreement parties within Israel suggest that organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad were already planning their response to Israel and Americas ‘best offer for peace’ some time before that doomed meeting in the woods of Maryland.

Arafat realised far too late that his bid for power was about to be revealed as just that, and that the sham of a state he was about to agree too wouldn’t last such a revelation, furthermore he also realised that if he tried to pull it off it would be the end of him politically, and would probably cost him his life.  Therefore ever the pragmatist he changed streams and retreated to his bombed out headquarters leading the battle for Palestinian liberation, as though the 1990’s never happened and he had simply moved the venue from Beirut to Ramallah.

The power of Israel over the policies of the United States can be overstated, Israel does not dictate US relations with Europe, nor have a veto on US economic concerns in the Middle East, but when it comes to a choice between Israel and the Arabs, the United States will always choose Israel.  This is not because she is consciously biased or because of some sinister anti-Arab plot, but for a number of reasons, the political structure of America being one, and also because Israel is in many ways a child of America, and the only banner of American style values in the region.  As long as this is true and as long as it is plausible that an Arab army will threaten Israel the United States will continue to defend Israeli interests in the Middle East.

Bibliography:

Hyland, William G. (1999) ‘Clintons World; Remaking American Foreign Policy’ Hyland, Westport Connecticut, USA, chp12, p156-158

Paterson, Thomas G. Merrill, Dennis. (1989) ‘Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914’ (4th Edt.) Heath, Lexington Missouri, p641,642,643,644,682,683

Said, Edward W. (1995) ‘Peace & Its Discontents; Gaza – Jericho 1993 – 1995’ Vintage, London, pXVI-XVII & p144,145,146

Kennedy and US Foreign Policy during the Cold War

kennedy BreznevBy Ian Howarth

The Eisenhower administration that preceded the election of President Kennedy had continued the Containment policies adopted by President Truman during the early days of the Cold War. Containment involved limiting the spread of Communism to within its own spheres of influence. This was achieved by giving aid to anti-communist regimes and promoting capitalist/western values.  The arrival of the Kennedy administration, marked a significant development in US foreign policy, as can be seen in the rhetoric of his inauguration speech.

‘Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.  This much we pledge, and more…’

Extract from the Inauguration Speech of John F. Kennedy 20th January 1961 

Since 1945 the US had attempted to contain the Soviet threat to Western Europe by allowing the USSR freedom of action within its sphere of influence and with the exception of the Berlin Blockade a quarter of a century earlier this policy had avoided a direct confrontation with the USSR.  Containment had been adopted as a pragmatic response to the understanding that Soviet conventional forces far outnumbered Allied Forces in Europe.  The maintenance by the United States of massive conventional forces in Western Europe would be expensive and unpractical, while containment offered the US a position that opposed the USSR while only requiring the defence of Western Europe not the liberation of the East.  This could be supplied relatively cheaply through the Nuclear Umbrella.  The leaders and supporters of the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian uprisings experienced the brutal consequences of this policy for themselves. With both countries firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence US policy was clear, it was a Soviet matter. The world watched on in horror as both uprisings were brutally suppressed by the USSR without US or Allied intervention despite the calls for help emanating from anti-communist forces in Prague and Budapest.

The arrival of the Kennedy administration to the White House in 1961 marked a sea change in US foreign policy towards the USSR and communism as a whole in the world, and marks the ascendance of Domino Theory within US policy making.  Under Truman, and Eisenhower the furthest the US had gone in actively preventing the spread of communism was through financial aid to states threatened by communist insurgences, or populist movements, with the one exception of Korea (1950 – 1953).  Korea was to represent the model for future engagements between East and West.  The Korean War saw a US led UN coalition supporting a US backed Capitalist South Korean regime on one side and a Soviet/Chinese backed communist Korean regime on the other.  This model of confrontation was to be repeated in Vietnam (1965–1973) and Afghanistan (1979-1989) with the US or USSR backing the insurgencies in each respectively and in the end seeing there advanced militaries suffer humiliating defeats at the hands of lightly armed yet popularly supported insurgents.

This change in policy within the US was in many ways a response to the policy that the USSR had been engaged in since the end of the Second World War.   This Soviet policy can be briefly described as the support of armed uprisings in foreign countries financially and militarily without the need for direct Soviet occupation or war waging.  This had first been seen in Korea in the early fifty’s and yet the US did not respond like with like until Kennedy.  The attempted invasion of Cuba, which led to the Bay of Pigs disaster, was a US funded operation, an attempt to remove a communist regime militarily without the direct use of US military assets, and therefore so the idea went, without the responsibility.  In this first tentative and disastrous case President Kennedy accepted full responsibility.  However, in the future official denial became the policy of many a president. This was seen in Chile where the CIA supported a coup against a democratically elected socialist regime in order to protect US interests.  With further similar examples in Afghanistan were the CIA and US special forces trained the mujahidin and supplied them with cash, intelligence and weapons, to fight off the Soviet invasion.

Without doubt the largest and most costly conflict of the Cold War involving the direct use of US troops was Vietnam.  This began during the Kennedy Administration as an Afghan or Cuban scenario, with advisors and military/financial assistance to the South Vietnamese who were facing a Soviet/Chinese supported Communist insurgency.   When it became apparent to Lyndon B Johnson following President Kennedy’s assassination that the assistance already being committed to Vietnam would not be sufficient to prevent a Vietminh takeover he committed US ground troops.   Vietnam was a punishing and ultimately futile ground war that failed to achieve any of the objectives that had been established for US Foreign Policy in South East Asia and caused the destabilisation and deaths of millions in Cambodia and Laos. The same thing was to happen in Afghanistan were repeated attempts by the USSR to establish a communist regime failed, requiring their direct intervention to bring about the desired result; like the US in Vietnam it was a futile effort.

These conflicts between East and West conducted through regional players are called proxy wars. Essentially this is where the two conflicting parties (USA/USSR) use other parties to do the dirty work. This avoids a nuclear confrontation while still achieving the strategic policy objectives against the enemy.  In Vietnam the Chinese and the Soviet Union provided assistance to the Communist Viet Cong, and in Afghanistan it was the US supplying aid to the Afghan resistance.

After Kennedy proxy wars became the norm and were waged across the world right up until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.  The results of these superpower driven conflicts in the developing world are still evident today.   Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as instability and autocratic regimes in Sudan, Algeria, Colombia and Cambodia are all remnants of Superpower intervention in the domestic disputes of nations, which in many cases intensified and prolonged the conflicts.

To quote President Kennedy again, ‘Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.  This much we pledge, and more…’

Kennedy’s inauguration rhetoric was clear in its intent for the future direction of US Foreign Policy, to ‘support any friend’, meant any friend, irrespective of intent or action as long as they backed the USA.   This is how brutal regimes like General Pinochet’s came to power with US support, ‘meet any hardship’, Vietnam, and ‘pay any price’, American assistance to Afghanistan totalled in the billions of dollars.  The benefits for US policy against the Soviet Union derived from Kennedy’s rhetoric were in the adoption of a foreign policy that allowed for a more aggressive and less restrained campaign against communist threats.   However, letting the leash off the CIA and the US military led to unsavoury practices and unexpected results, as more often than not ‘supporting any friend…’ led to corruption and scandal as well as the US becoming involved in illegal practices such as the Iran Contra Affair of Reagan’s Presidency. While ‘paying any price…’ meant inflated defence and intelligence budgets which angered Congress and worried the US taxpayer, which in turn led to more underhand dealings, again citing the Iran Contra affair were the USA was not only in violation of a UN security council resolution banning the sale of weapons to Iran or Iraq, but the CIA with the undoubted knowledge and support of the president conspired to keep the costs of this adventure hidden from Congress and the taxpayer.

Kennedy’s brief administration marked a turning point from the post war period of limited engagement and low cost support of friendly foreign regimes, to the start of the full commitment of all US military and intelligence assets to the defeat of Soviet foreign policy objectives worldwide.  The extent of its success is for others to judge, although the need of the USSR to keep pace with the relentless advances in US technologies and economic developments in the end crippled the economy of the USSR which ultimately led to its collapse.  It is arguable that this was always the inevitable consequence of Soviet polices when faced with competitive and dynamic capitalist free markets.  However, as can be seen in the case of China, without the intense pressure and relentless checking of Soviet moves globally by the US and its Allies it is possible that we could still be living in a world split between East and West, one in which the USSR was given the time to adapt and change as the Chinese did.

Cosmopolitanism in a World Without Borders

By Ian Howarth

The UN Charter is the central document of international law, its basic principles are that states should be ‘good citizens of international society; recognise that states have equal rights…and legitimate interests which deserve respect even if they may conflict with the interests of your own state; act in good faith; observe international law; punish aggressors; observe the laws of war; [and] be magnanimous in victory…’  (Booth & Smith 1995: 116)  The lack of moral prescriptions on the legitimate actions of states within their own borders means that gross violations of human rights conducted within states do not violate international law.  Political cosmopolitanism argues that these violations should be deemed illegal by international law, with international structures responsible for their enforcement.un_gen_assembly

The view taken in this essay is best described as cosmopolitan utilitarian realism.  This is based on the principles of moral cosmopolitanism with a utilitarian attitude to the costs of action or inaction in the current international system.  There is no argument for a world government, or United Nations Army both of which are unrealistic and undesirable.  The argument is based on moral principles enshrined within a reformed United Nations, that are enforced through the Security Council by nations who themselves embody these principles.  The view is realist due to its recognition of the state system, and the primacy of the state as the sole actor capable of enforcing, and upholding cosmopolitan values.

Cosmopolitanism:

Cosmopolitanism is not a single coherent doctrine addressing the injustices of the current systems of global governance; it can be divided into two branches the first moral cosmopolitanism and the second political cosmopolitanism.  Despite the substantive differences between each approach, they share three central principles.  That all human beings have a common moral identity, that there are universal standards of normative judgment derived from this common morality, and that a cosmopolitan political order needs to be established to enforce and protect these principles.

Moral cosmopolitanism is concerned with the first two principles, common human morality, and universal normative judgments made on the basis of this morality.  Moral cosmopolitans largely accept the current state system and attempt to import moral cosmopolitan certainties in to this existing order.  The acceptance of the overall structure of the state system is not in question here; the argument facing moral prescriptive war is by what standards states should be held accountable.  Currently the standards are based on bi-lateral relations and strategic interests that maintain state borders as representing a separation between international and domestic politics.

A World without Borders:

Political cosmopolitanism places the rights of the individual above the rights of the state, whereas international law places rights in the hands of states.  In order to bring about a cosmopolitan political order it is therefore necessary for this current dispensation to be reversed or at least significantly re-distributed.  However, practically states are not about to relinquish their monopoly on legitimacy in international relations; besides the state is the only and best guarantor of human rights and democracy.  This is not always the case.  In many parts of the world states abuse or neglect their role as guarantors of individual rights, or have disintegrated so no central sovereignty is in control of the state apparatus.

The validity of borders in the modern world is questioned by Robert Kaplan in his book ‘The Coming Anarchy’ where he points to state structures in West Africa.  Arguing that ‘Disease, over-population, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations [are causing] the increasing erosion of nation states and international borders.’  (Kaplan 2000: 7)  The reality of the political structure of West Africa as in many other parts of the world, like South East Asia, and the Caucasus’s, is far removed from the confident defined depictions of states found on maps.  The neo-realist approach taken by Kaplan argues for the American domination of international institutions to bring order to the international system.  He sees the world’s problems being remedied by strong government and free market economics, with the failures of the later lying in the lack of stable strong governments.  Kaplan does not question the nature of government, believing that its purpose is to secure its territory and provide a stable environment for economic activity.

The need for the reform of institutions like the UN is not disputed here, but the nature of the reform is.  The argument here is for placing moral cosmopolitan norms at the centre of international law, with particular emphasis on human rights, and does not accept the pretence that globalisation alone can bring about an end to international terrorism, disease and poverty.  Cosmopolitanism argues that solutions to these problems are as much political as economic, and that the preservation of individual rights should come before economic considerations.

Kaplan’s argues for American economic hegemony.  However, the current structure of the international political economy is unjust, creating many of the problems that Kaplan highlights.  Poverty and corruption in West Africa is as much the result of unfair trading practices, through the exploitation of the developing world by the developed west.  Johan Galtung argues in ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’ (1971), that developed, and developing world elites (centres) share common interests in their economic relationships, while the relative poor (periphery) of each society share few common interests.  This prevents the common distillation of global opposition from this majority against the injustices of elite relations.  ‘It is a sophisticated type of dominance relation which cuts across nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the centre in the Centre nation establishes in the centre of the periphery nation, for the joint benefit of both.’  (Galtung, 1971: 81)  This neo-Marxist argument highlights the effects of first world economic practices on political stability in the developing world.  They undermine the bedrock on which stable political institutions can be built, which, as Kaplan admits, is the creation of a middle class, a process inhibited by these practices.

The issue of economics and political stability are bound together in a ruthless cycle.  World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules on intellectual property and agriculture, disproportionately favour the developed west.  Regional policies like the European Unions (EU) common agricultural policy (CAP) provide vast subsidies for farmers to grow more food than is needed, which floods international markets and drives prices down.  If one thing could be done economically to readdress the problems facing the developing world, that contribute to the ‘anarchy’ that Kaplan points to, it is the removal of these unfair trade subsidies, and the establishment of genuine free trade in agricultural goods.  It is only in these areas of economic activity that the largely pre-industrial economies of the developing world can achieve significant growth, to the benefit of western taxpayers, and the wealth of the developing world.

Kaplan’s postmodernist view that the international system, with its reliance on operating entirely through state vs. state relations, is not capable of adapting to the ‘coming anarchy’ is convincing.  Kaplan’s portrayal of a disintegrating third world causing mass population movements across borders, and fuelling the development of Victorian like urban zones on the coastal edges of war torn and disease infested interiors, highlights the scope and urgency of the problems facing the developing world.  His judgment that they will only breed greater resentment towards the developed world, creating new opportunities for radical doctrines, and terrorist groups, is also credible in the light of the war on terror.  It is the economic prescription he provides as a solution, which fails to understand the role of western economic policies in creating instability in the developing world that is less so.

The solution to Kaplan’s anarchy were ‘a minority of the population will be, as Francis Fukuyama would put it, sufficiently sheltered so as to enter a “post-historical” realm, living in cities and suburbs in which the environment has been mastered and ethnic animosities have been quelled by bourgeois prosperity, [while] an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history, living in shanty towns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by lack of water to drink, soil to till and space to survive in.’ (Kaplan 2000: 22) Is the establishment of a new system of state relations that goes beyond the realms of state interests and economics, and recognises our common intrinsic humanity.

This recognition of our common humanity would require Kantian principles on human rights to be established in the actions of statesmen, and the recognition of the cosmopolitan argument that statesmen are in the best position to effect change in international relations.  Kantianism argues that statesmen should ‘…always remember that people in other countries are human beings just like yourself; observe common morality; respect human rights; assist those who are in need of material aid which you can supply at no sacrifice to yourself; in waging war spare non-combatants…. these normative considerations are characteristic of a world society in which responsibility is defined by ones membership in the human race, and thus by common morality’ (Booth & Smith 1995: 117) Kantian arguments on statesmen as members of the international community focus on changing behaviour within current systems to meet the demands of human rights, and highlights the influencing role states can play in promoting this agenda.

Kaplan’s view of the coming anarchy is widely dismissed by cosmopolitans due to its neo-realist economic prescriptions, however valid the underlying symptoms of instability he points to are.  The collapse of states in Africa is at a developed stage, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Sudan, Somalia and Angola are figments of western imaginations; where state structures exist they are largely weak and ineffective.  In reality, these states are divided by civil conflict and/or ruled by warlords.  In the coming decades the effects of HIV/Aids on the productivity of these states will only reinforce, and accelerate the process.  The true political map of Africa, as in parts of South East Asia (Indonesia, Philippines) and South America (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) is increasingly fragmented, with territory under the control of powers not recognised by the international community, but in every meaningful way to the people who live there as potent as any state.

The coming anarchy is no longer theory; it is a reality that can be seen in international terrorism (New York, Bali, Madrid, London, Iraq, Boston), failed states (Sierra Leone, DR. Congo, Afghanistan), nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation (Iran, North Korea) and the growing consequences of our civilisation on the environment (Global Warming).  The failure of cosmopolitan theory to recognise these realities limits the effectiveness of its prescriptions.  Cosmopolitan approaches to the international system like all other liberal arguments must adapt to present threats, this means acting pragmatically and recognising that many of the solutions to these problems lie in coercion (economic/diplomatic), and the use of force against dangerous regimes, and ideologies.

Liberal Internationalism:

Liberal Internationalism argues for the establishment of strong international institutions that can ‘…transform…international relations from a ‘jungle’ of chaotic power politics to a zoo of peaceful intercourse.’  (Jackson & Sorensen 1999: 119)  Liberal internationalism aims to create global regimes that regulate the behaviour of states within specific areas.  The regimes would operate at three levels in the international system; intergovernmental, transnational and supranational, all three types can exist at either international or regional levels of state interaction.  The system relies on the cooperation of states, with the system itself promoting cooperation by ‘…[alleviating] the lack of trust between states and the states’ fear of each other which are considered to be the traditional problems associated with international anarchy.’  (Jackson & Sorensen 1999: 122)

Liberal internationalism is a classical political cosmopolitan approach, with a Wilsonian vision of international relations.  The aim of liberal internationalist theory is a ‘world of self-determining peoples whose relations with each other are regulated, on a consensual basis, through international institutions.’  (Hutchings 1999: 157)  This institutionalised system was envisaged in the foundation of the League of Nations and the United Nations.  The consensual nature of liberal institutionalism presents a bar on the valid use of force in the international system on moral grounds.  It is unlikely that institutions built on consensus would have the ability to take action against transgressors of moral cosmopolitan values in a system that credited all states with equal legitimacy.

Contemporary liberal internationalism is represented in the works of theorists such as Francis Fukuyama who in ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ argues ‘that liberal democracy and free market capitalism satisfy between them the human desires which form the motor of historical development…’  (Cited in Hutchings 1999: 158)  Fukuyama’s view of the future sees the world divided in a way similar to Robert Kaplan, with a post historical western minority insulated in a technological bubble removed from the majority whose existence continues to deteriorate.  However, Fukuyama unlike Kaplan believes that this post historical world will see the triumph of liberal democracy over other political structures for the reasons stressed above, and that the problems of the developing world will be solved through this evolution from anarchy to democracy.  However, the argument of gradual progress through cooperation or isolation does not offer a solution to genocide, or rogue states acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBCW).  The entrusting of human rights into international institutions that treat states equally by liberal internationalism fails to create a system in which the enforcement of cosmopolitan norms can be achieved.

Cosmopolitan Democracy:

Cosmopolitan Democracy and liberal internationalism argue that the ‘fundamental principle of democracy is a principle of autonomy…a principle of individual self-determination under constitutional law which protects the encroachment on those fundamental human rights which are a condition of individual self-determination in the first place.’  (Hutchings 1999: 158,160)  However, cosmopolitan democracy doesn’t seek state consensus, arguing that this principle of autonomy can be achieved through the global development of democracy.

Daniele Archibugi argues that ‘Cosmopolitan democracy is based on the assumption that important objectives – control of the use of force, respect for human rights, self-determination – will be obtained only through the extension and development of democracy…[and]…. attempts to apply the principles of democracy internationally.’  (Archibugi 2003: 7)  Cosmopolitan democracies approach to bringing universal recognition of human rights is based on the establishment of global democracy.  This does not necessarily mean the creation of a world government, Archibugi argues that to democratise the world needs ‘…institutions, which enable the voice of individuals to be heard in global affairs, irrespective of their resonance at home.’  (Archibugi 2003: 8)

Cosmopolitan Democratic arguments for cosmopolitan norms within the international system unlike those for international liberalism fail to provide practical structures through which to meet their objectives.  In contrast international liberalism operates inside the state system, proposing a structure which arguably exists in part today through the web of international and regional regimes that operate in the international system.  Cosmopolitan democrats like Daniele Archibugi, seek to establish a system of global democracy through nothing more than a powerful argument.  This view is unrealistic, however laudable the attempts of cosmopolitan democrats to create organisations that encourage the free exchange of ideas and views across borders, interaction between intellectuals will never lead to global democracy.

Governments might no longer be in a position to control information and prevent interaction between people across the globe, but communication alone will not bring about a democratic revolution.  The aversion to what cosmopolitan democrats regard as liberal fundamentalism, as argued by Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilisations), in the enforcement of a position in a coercive or robust manner is self-defeating.  Beginning a big conversation is fine, but to expect that the nattering of intellectuals will lead to utopia is ridiculous.

Mary Kaldor’s cosmopolitan democratic approach in ‘New and Old Wars’ to the failure of humanitarian interventions argues that, ’[a]…political response…a strategy of capturing ‘hearts and minds’ needs to be counterposed to the strategy of sowing ‘fear and hate’.  A politics of inclusion needs to be counterposed against a politics of exclusion; respect for international principles and legal norms needs to be counterposed against the criminality of the warlords.  In short, what is needed is a new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization, which embraces both…. the international community and local populations, and which is capable of countering the submission of various forms of particularism.’  (Kaldor 2001: 114)  This argument for an inclusive strategy of political mobilisation that focuses on the individual, and does not resort to the coercion of states or groups into compliance with cosmopolitan norms is an argument for inaction.

Cosmopolitan political mobilization requires a politically literate and responsive population; conditions that do not exist in the developing world outside universities or political elites.  The political mobilisation that occurs in the wider population is based on ignorance and indoctrination, demonstrable in the spread of extreme Islamic nationalism.  The average citizen of an autocracy is illiterate, hungry and scared; the proposition that they would have the time yet alone the inclination and understanding to absorb cosmopolitan critique of their situation is unlikely.  The positive work done through organisations such as the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, and other academic and humanitarian organisations in attempting to create a global cosmopolitan discourse is undoubted; to educate and promulgate the concept of universal human rights, and promote democracy can only help to further the goals of cosmopolitanism.  However, it does not deal with the need for an immediate solution to human rights abuses, terrorism and state disintegration.

Other cosmopolitan democrats like David Held have provided a more realistic argument for achieving political cosmopolitan goals in the international system.  Held convincingly argues that the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ‘…mark(s) …[a]…significant step away from the classic regime of state sovereignty – sovereignty, that is, as effective power – toward the firm entrenchment of the ‘liberal regime of international sovereignty’…sovereignty shaped and delimited by new broader frameworks of governance and law.’  (Held, 2003: 187)  He goes on to argue that ‘…the containment of armed aggression can only be achieved through both the control of warfare and the prevention of the abuse of human rights.’  (Held 2003: 187)  Held’s cosmopolitan democratic arguments for a regime of ‘liberal international sovereignty’ go far in reaching the prescriptions of utilitarian cosmopolitanism.

Held argues that this regime would ‘entrench powers and constraints, and rights and duties in international law which – albeit ultimately formulated by states – go beyond the traditional conception of the proper scope and boundaries of states, and can come into conflict, and sometimes contradiction, with national laws.  Within this framework, states may forfeit claims to sovereignty, and individuals to sovereign protection, if they violate the standards and vales embedded in the international liberal order… violations…[would] no longer be a matter of morality alone…but breaches of…legal code…that may call forth the means to prosecute and rectify it.’  (Held, 2003: 189)  This liberal regime represents a robust implementation of cosmopolitan norms at an international level, overturning sovereignty when violations occur and enforcing its legal codes.  However, Held, like Archibugi, is attempting to democratise the international system, and the earlier criticism of this approach with regard to destabilising countries with no middle classes, or traditions to support this process apply.

Held provides a structure that would place human rights and self-determination at the heart of the international system, but in a state based structure; failed states without true political cohesion and suffering from internal conflict would not fit any better into this liberal international order than they do today, this requires a doctrine allowing intervention and nation building.  Held also ignores the wider problems of NBCW proliferation, terrorism, and political radicalisation (Islamic fundamentalism, nationalism, and neo-fascism) these involve issues that are not directly human rights based, requiring intervention by the developed west for international peace and security and based on political and strategic determinations.

Although Held’s construct is convincing and wholly acceptable in the round, its failure to meet issues of international peace and stability based on the actions of states or terrorist groups, would leave the world more just, but not more stable.  Furthermore, his determination to make democracy as integral a part of his prescription as human rights means that it lacks pragmatic realism; in the sense that to enforce a liberal democracy on the international system would require such overwhelming coercion that it would effectively be the declaration of a world war by liberal democracy.

This goal of democratisation is laudable, but unrealistic, the aim of cosmopolitanism should be the international acceptance of a relationship of respect between citizens and states, based on the recognition of human rights.  The acceptance of human rights first and foremost would have the effect of promoting liberal democracy without destabilising the international system through a perpetual conflict against un-democratic regimes, a significant proportion of which are largely benign, e.g. Pakistan, Cuba, & Iran.  It is the requirement for global democracy, with Archibugi’s refusal to accept the need for coercion on one hand, and Held’s coercion in defence self-determination on the other, that makes cosmopolitan democracy an idealistic approach, and incapable of establishing legitimate prescriptions for war in the pursuit of human rights and international stability.  The argument below for military action in the defence of human rights, the control of NBCW proliferation, and against terrorism is premised on a proportionate response, and not a declaration of war against autocracy; its prime concern being the achievement of a humane strategic stability in the international system.

Utilitarian Cosmopolitanism; An Argument for Action:

Utilitarianism in the context of military force in international relations is a reference to the ‘greater good argument’, this is to say that ‘since all individuals seek pleasure and the avoidance of pain, a universal franchise [is] the only way of promoting ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ (Heywood 1997: 71).  Jeremy Bentham conceived the universal franchise to be suffrage.  However, this applied universally as discussed within cosmopolitan democracy is impractical.  The universal franchise that is argued for here is human rights, a universal recognition of basic rights of humanity enforced through a credible deterrent.  The greatest good, for the greatest number of people could be most effectively achieved through the following mechanism.  Cosmopolitan utilitarianism is a pragmatic application of moral utilitarianism within the political ambitions of cosmopolitanism that recognises the current structure of the international system.

Utilitarianism is applied to this argument because the ‘greater good argument’ lies at the heart of the prescriptions of utilitarian cosmopolitanism, the greater good of providing recognition of human rights for the widest number of people through the maximization of the resources available to international society.  This requires the limitation of military action to the support of human rights or the preservation of peace to the most extreme cases; an absence of democracy would not be a sufficient premise for intervention.  The utility of this approach is in its acceptance of consequentiality.  The final consequences of action or inaction in a specific circumstance would be the central question when taking military action that will undoubtedly result in the death of innocents.

Within utilitarian cosmopolitanism, this choice is based on the risk to individuals from gross human rights violations, or the threat to international peace and security from unstable or unscrupulous states attempting to acquire NBCW.  ‘If a trade-off is to be made, it should favour whatever is more important to the living of a satisfactory human life, and since the protection of vital interests is plausibly taken to be a necessary condition for such a life, such protection takes priority.’  (Jones 1999: 41)  Within utilitarian cosmopolitanism, the vital interests are basic principles of human rights and the maintenance of peace and stability in the international system.  The legitimacy of state sovereignty would be judged against cosmopolitan criteria with the aim of introducing credible justice in to the international system.  These criteria would not require states to be free from all human rights abuses, but would prohibit genocide, the forced moving of populations, and the use of military or para-military forces against civilian populations, the sponsorship of international terrorism, and the proliferation of NBCW’s.

The criteria would not be enforced through a consensual institutionalised system of equal states, but through the advancement of liberal democratic norms in the international system.  It would require the core democratic states (e.g. France, Britain, USA, Germany, India) to cooperate in enforcing these criteria upon the rest of the international community through a reformed United Nations and Security Council given this moral purpose.  This system would not de-legitimise autocratic regimes, on the contrary, states that are stable internally and externally, at peace with the international system and not committing gross violations of the criteria stated above would be accepted within the system as members of the Rim of states.  Outside the Core due to their lack of democracy but associated with the Core through the global economy, as full members of the international community as long as they continue to operate within the norms of the system.

States outside this sphere of international stability (the Core and the Rim) will be classed as part of the Periphery which can be characterised as unstable or failed states such as Somalia and Liberia or states which are responsible for gross violations of human rights (Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge), or that threaten peace and stability through the sponsorship of terrorism (Libya), or the development of NBCW (North Korea).  States that are classed as peripheral will be in clear breach of the utilitarian cosmopolitan criteria stated above.  The international community will class states that violate these criteria as illegitimate authorities, their claims to the protections of sovereignty will be void, and they will face legitimate intervention by the Core to bring them back into compliance with the norms of the system.

This argument could be associated with Mark Duffield’s ‘Liberal Peace Theory’, which ‘combines and conflates ‘liberal’ (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction).  It reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising, and, especially, transformational measures.  While this can include the provision of immediate relief and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy’ (Duffield, 2002: 11)

The pursuit of international peace and stability that both Duffield’s ‘Liberal Peace’ and Utilitarian Cosmopolitanism seeks is a shared objective.  However, the means of reaching this goal are very different.  Duffield’s neo-Liberal argument is more concerned with securing stability on the borders between liberal developed society, and the developing world, with the aim of stabilising unstable regions of the developing world to protect the Liberal world from violence emanating from these regions, while also allowing for their participation in the global economy, providing growth opportunities for western economies.  Duffield rejects the utilitarian cosmopolitan argument for extending human rights universally as a step towards the creation of greater freedoms and stability in the developing world.  Duffield seeks stability in the global south for the benefit of the developed west, and not the extension of the Liberal zone of stability through the effective use of military force, and economic structural change.  Duffield effectively argues for the construction of walls around liberal societies, with channels of economic activity extending beyond the walls to the developing world, channels maintained by liberal peacekeeping missions ensuring the stability required for economic activity.

Utilitarian Cosmopolitanism is not a neo-Liberal argument concerned only with the protection of western interests, although it rejects the extension of democracy, on pragmatic grounds, as a goal, it stills argues for the cosmopolitan principles of universal human rights, and the creation of civil societies to support these rights.  It differs from traditional cosmopolitan approaches (cosmopolitan democrats, liberal internationalism) in that it prescribes the use of military force against violators of these principles, and in the defence of the liberal democratic world from tyrannical regimes threatening international peace through developing NBCW.  This approach argues that before stable and lasting civil societies can be constructed military force may need to be used against the dominant tendencies toward extremism, violence and corruption that currently prevail in these societies and cause instability, the repression of human rights, and continued poverty.

This could be mistaken for moral imperialism.  However, the distinction between imperialism and cosmopolitanism is clear; the latter is an economic imperative that seeks domination over other states, with their assimilation and subordination to the colonial power.  Cosmopolitan prescriptions do not tolerate this, excepting diverse cultures as essential in the development of vibrant and just societies.  Moves towards moral imperialism would be unlikely to gain popular support amongst the core democracies as it would represent a retrograde step, inevitably leading to international instability and great power rivalry, both contrary to the aims of utilitarian cosmopolitanism.

An example of this kind of action can be found in the UN mission to Somalia in which due to the lack of a host government from which to gain prior approval the UN Security Council under resolution 794 ‘….  [Explicitly authorized] the establishment of a force on humanitarian grounds…’  (Brown 2002: 147)  The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) spearheaded by the United States effectively invaded Somalia and established a humanitarian government over the territory.  The initial premise, and the action taken by UNITAF, is entirely within the prescriptions of utilitarian cosmopolitanism in relation to failed states.  However, the short-term commitment of UNITAF, and the failure to continue its robust intervention through to a concerted disarmament of the militia groups, led to the failure of the intervention.  Despite this, it does provide evidence that interventions of this kind are practical, but that they require the binding of the Core nations to a legal structure.  The lack of this in the international system meant that the UN withdrawal was able to go ahead despite the obvious failure of its mission and the chaos that would follow in its wake.

This approach to implementing moral cosmopolitan norms into the international system represents a utilitarian view on how to achieve the greatest impact within the current system, and bring about the best possible outcome for the greatest number of people.  It both respects notions of sovereignty and removes them as the prime concern of international relations.  The implementation of this conditional sovereignty would lead to the self-regulation of autocratic regimes who would balance their policies so as not to violate the conditions of their legitimacy, therefore lessening the negative impacts of their rule to limited human rights violations and political restrictions.  Although this is unsavoury, benign autocracies such as Pakistan, and China, provide stability to regions that forced into democracy without an educated population base to support it, would probably descend into chaos and civil conflict.  The pragmatism of the greater good argument means that this is a necessary evil of peace in the international system.

Arguments against Utilitarian Cosmopolitanism:

Ethical relativism as presented by Michael Waltzer argues that liberal democracies cannot use universal judgments about the nature of humanity to judge other societies who do not subscribe to these judgements.  Walzer argues that universal judgments cannot be made using the criteria of one culture against another, that only within cultures can norms be established.  For example, Walzer argues ‘…that a commitment to universal human rights constitutes a central feature of the shared understanding of a contemporary Western society like the United States, then it follows that, from a Walzerian particularist perspective, we have reason to accept that commitment to universal human rights [within western society].’  (Jones 1999: 183)  We can accept this within western society, but are prohibited from holding human rights as a bar to other cultures, unless they arrive at the same consensus on the universality of human rights independently.

This position makes the practices of different cultures morally equivalent; this is to say that the autocratic practices of Saudi Arabia are morally equivalent with those of the plural democracies of the European Union, due to the fact that each position was attained through community consensus.  This is a dangerous means of justifying norms as acceptable, as it could sanction almost anything as long as it attained consensus within its political sphere.  As Charles Jones argues ‘It is no moral refutation of a moral claim to say that there is no consensus in its favour in every culture in the world, nor is a moral claim plausibly defended by citing only its widespread appeal…Moral views are properly judged not by determining how many people (or cultures) subscribe to them, but the plausibility of the reasons adduced in their favour’ (Jones 1999: 184) The reasons adduced in the favour of the universality of human rights are that humans are a common species and that one person’s determination that torture, or genocide is immoral, is a plausible view to associate with humanity as a whole.

Neo-Hegelian arguments attempt to preserve the ethical value of the state while maintaining the moral importance of the individual.  This view appears to be close to utilitarian cosmopolitanism, however neo-Hegelians and cosmopolitans disagree ‘…on the question of the necessity of separate sovereign states for the living of individual worthwhile lives.’  (Jones 1999: 207)  Within utilitarian cosmopolitanism, sovereignty is only respected as long as the sovereign state protects human rights, and respects non-proliferation of NBCW; failing this sovereignty ceases to be recognised and is open to intervention to restore international law.  The neo-Hegelian respect for the abstract notion of state sovereignty in conditions that would violate cosmopolitan norms, and wouldn’t sanction military action to rectify the situation, means that although neo-Hegelian theory raises the hope of mediating the differences between communitarians and cosmopolitans in encompassing the demands of the community with those of the individual, it fails by placing the requirements of the community of states over the rights of the individual.

Conclusion:

This essay has examined political cosmopolitan approaches to the implementation of moral cosmopolitan norms, and shown that practically they fail to offer a basis from which action can be taken in the defence of these norms.  The requirement for democracy held by democratic cosmopolitans and the equality of states within liberal internationalism, present idealistic and unrealistic conditions respectively.  Liberal internationalism holds the sovereignty of states as the basis of its argument, at a time, when in parts of the world the integrity of states is being undermined.  Cosmopolitan democrats wish to export democracy to an illiterate and unresponsive world, which could lead to greater instability and war.

Democracy cannot be transplanted anywhere, it requires certain conditions to flourish.  Critical of these is the existence of two circumstances that do not prevail in the developing regions of the world, ‘both a middle class and civil institutions are required for successful democracy, democratic Russia, which inherited neither from the Soviet regime, remains violent, unstable, and miserably poor despite its 99 percent literacy rate…[while]…under its authoritarian system China has dramatically improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people…Russia may be failing because it is a democracy and China may be succeeding in part because it is not…’  (Kaplan 2000: 64)  The argument that Kaplan is presenting here is not that authoritarianism is good and democracy bad, but that ‘…democracy emerges successfully only as the capstone to other social and economic achievements.’  (Kaplan 2000: 66)

Utilitarian cosmopolitanism is a rational, pragmatic approach to the central issues in the international system today, which counteracts neo-conservative and realist agendas that dismiss universal concepts of human rights, and continue to argue that states and their interests are the only basis for action within the international system.  These realist perspectives resist the establishment of international norms on the basis that it limits a state’s ability to protect itself in an anarchic international environment.  Utilitarian cosmopolitanism refutes this argument, presenting a system that seeks international and personal security but within the context of international norms; arguing that this is necessary due to the destabilising effect of human rights violations, and the threat of NBCW in the hands of extremist regimes and terrorist groups, on the international system.

References:

Archibugi, Daniele (2003) Cosmopolitical Democracy, Ed. Daniele Archibugi, Debating Cosmopolitics, Verso, London, pp.7, pp.8,

Booth, Ken, Smith, Steve (1995) International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge pp.117

Brown, Chris (2002) Sovereignty, Rights and Justice; International Political Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.147

Duffield, Mark (2002) Global Governance and the New Wars, Zed Books, London, pp.11

Galtung, Johan (1971) A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.13, No.2, University of Tsforlageg pp.81

Held, David (2003) Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age, Ed. Daniele Archibugi, Debating Cosmopolitics, Verso, London, pp.187, pp.189, pp.194, pp.195

Heywood, Andrew (1997) Politics, Palgrave, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Great Britain, pp.71

Hutchings, Kimberley (1999) International Political Theory, Sage Publications, London, pp.157, pp.158, pp.160

Jackson, Robert & Sorensen, Georg (1999) Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.119, pp.122

Jones, Charles (1999) Global Justice; Defending Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.41, pp.183, pp.184, pp.207

Kaldor, Mary (2001) New & Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.114

Kaplan, Robert D. (2000) The Coming Anarchy; Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, Vintage Books, New York, pp.7, pp.22

The Legitimacy of War; An Argument in Defence of Human Rights

unBy Ian Howarth

The international community should sanction the use of military force against states that have through their own actions such as committing gross human rights violations, made their claims to sovereignty illegitimate.  This principle lies at the heart of the argument for the legitimacy of an extension within international relations of prescriptive war on human rights grounds.

Prescriptive War is conflict fought or instigated on pre-determined rules/laws contained within treaty obligations (United Nations Charter, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) or in the enforcement of internationally recognised values (Human Rights).  The central principle of prescriptive war is the pre-determined nature of its responses; if State(s) A, does X then State(s) B can do Y, with no further re-course to a higher institution or power.  It is a structural framework that pre-judges responses to pre-defined events in international relations.

Prescriptive War has been defined above but before continuing it is important to define some of the other terms used in this essay and explain the categorization of Just and Cosmopolitan War as prescriptive war.  Just War is a prescriptive war because it is determined as just or unjust through the application of defined criteria (Grotius, & Articles 2 & 51 of the UN Charter), similarly a cosmopolitan war is defined by the conflicts aim, or in its result; which is the extension or enforcement of the principles of moral cosmopolitanism.  The use of the term ‘cosmopolitan war’ in place of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is deliberate to highlight its political aspirations beyond immediate or long-term humanitarian needs.

Moral Cosmopolitanism:

‘Cosmopolitanism is an ancient term which shares its origins with the concept of natural law in stoicism and the stoic’s famous claim to be a citizen of the universe (cosmopolis) and not simply a citizen of any particular polity’ (Hutchings, 1999: 35).  The meaning of the stoics claim was that the standards governing human conduct were ‘inscribed in nature and available to reason’ (Hutchings, 1999: 35).  As Hutchings argues ‘The search for a universally applicable account of the quality of human life has, on its side, the promise of a greater power to stand up for the lives of those whom tradition has oppressed and marginalized.’  (Hutchings, 1999: 41)

The basis of the cosmopolitan critique of the international system is the belief in essential truths about humanity that transcend political and theological structures.  These truths are that all human beings share a common moral identity, which is premised on the belief that there are universal standards of normative judgment that come from our common morality, and that there should be a cosmopolitan political order to establish and protect these principles.  Not all moral cosmopolitans subscribe to the last principle, as it is the central idealist aspiration of political cosmopolitan critique.

While political cosmopolitanism in particular is likely to use moral assertions in its arguments, moral cosmopolitanism which is primarily concerned with the first two principles, common human morality, and the ability to base universal normative judgments on this morality, does not require a supra national cosmopolitan political order.  Therefore, moral cosmopolitans can be found in almost all theoretical approaches in international relations, they can be realists, Hedley Bull, or critical theorists, Michael Walzer, as well as political cosmopolitans like David Held, Andrew Linklater and Daniele Archibugi.  They all take the current state system as a given fact and attempt to import moral cosmopolitan certainties in to the existing international order from their differing theoretical approaches.

Therefore, moral cosmopolitanism is not necessarily political in its applications; it is prescribing a set of principles and examining various levels of human interaction and authority by them.  As a consequence, it can be applied to various issues, such as human rights, distributive justice, and within other theoretical frameworks, e.g. Utilitarianism and Marxism.  The central principles of moral cosmopolitan theory are going to be addressed in this chapter, through focusing on the ideals of common human rights, and the basis from which the enforcement of these rights can be used to sanction the use of military force.

Cosmopolitan arguments on the existence of universal human rights are recognised in other schools of thought.  International society theorists argue that ‘every member of the world’s population…[posses]…equal rights as human beings- human rights – regardless of the country they happen to live in.  But they also see human rights at the present time still subordinate to the rights of sovereign states.’  (Booth & Smith, 1995: 111)  This approach is distinctive from cosmopolitanism due to the subordination of human rights to the state; they see human rights as a construct of the state, and as a consequence potentially subject to deconstruction by the state.  The moral cosmopolitan belief in the existence of a universal human morality, with the ability to ascribe normative judgments upon them is arguing that all human beings share a desire to be free, secure, and able to build safe and secure lives.  It places the individual at the centre of international relations rather than the state as the bearer of these rights, arguing that the enforcement of these rights should be the primary concern of international relations.

Cosmopolitan grounds for military action are premised on the enforcement of moral cosmopolitan values, and extend into the enforcement of plural democracy.  The prescriptive nature of this type of conflict has grown out of much older arguments about Just War Theory.  The relevance of Just War Theory to the wider question of the legitimacy of cosmopolitan prescriptive war is in its use of prescriptive pre-judgments on just grounds for taking military action.  Just War theory provides a foundation for prescriptive conflict, and in this case will highlight the distinction between wars that are ‘just’ and wars that are cosmopolitan, while also demonstrating the legitimacy of prescriptive war as a concept.

The Legitimacy of Prescriptive Conflict; Just War Theory

Just War Theory is a set of prescriptive conditions from which legitimate conflict can be declared within the international system.  These prescriptive conditions have unlike those of moral cosmopolitanism been accepted by the developed west, and are enshrined within the Charter of the United Nations, which only permits war on the basis of self-defence, or through the sanction of the Security Council.  The legitimacy of this form of conflict in international relations stands in contrast to the response of realist and other critics of the prescribed conditions that cosmopolitans argue should be adopted as legitimate grounds for action within international relations.  Michael Walzer argues that there “should be a strong international system, organised and designed to defeat aggression, to stop massacres and to guarantee the physical security of all the worlds peoples” (cited in Lloyd, 2003: 23)

Just War is a controversial concept that has entertained social philosophers and theologians over many centuries.  The characteristics of a ‘just war’ set out by theorists and academics like Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Michael Walzer allow us to determine whether a war is just war or not.  Sections of academia within international relations dispute the concept of just war, and argue that all war is unjust, that you cannot legalise war.  In particular they point to the fact that all so called ‘just wars’ are classified as such by the victors, for example the Kosovo War was proclaimed as a ‘just war’ by the British prime minister Tony Blair who said that it was  ‘…a just war in a just cause for the values of civilization itself…’  (Gilbert, 1999: 895)

In war, all sides declare their cause to be just.  In Kosovo, the stated reasons for the action taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were illegal but according to its political leaders morally legitimate; Tony Blair declared that ‘…It is right for the international community to prevent genocide and protect human rights, even if it entails a violation of state sovereignty…’  (Cited in Archibugi, 2003: 10)  In contrast, Slobodan Milosevic’s claims within international law were entirely legal.  The argument presented by Milosevic that his campaign in Kosovo was against Albanian secessionists who threatened the integrity of the Yugoslav state was legally correct and represented a legitimate ‘just cause’.  He was motivated by the primacy of national sovereignty, the right of nations to preserve their sovereignty from internal as well as external threats.  In the eyes of Belgrade, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) represented a threat to the national integrity of Serbia and so the KLA ‘terrorists’ had to be defeated to restore this integrity.

The point here is not that Milosevic was justified to act in the way he did.  It is however that the very notion or classifications of a war as ‘just’ or illegitimate is subjective and that legality within international law does not always work in harmony with liberal humanitarian logic.  The disparity between moral justice and international law that underpins current prescriptions for war (Articles 2 & 51 of the UN Charter), represent an inadequate structure on which to base decisions on action or inaction against tyrants like Milosevic; a structure that fails to uphold and promote liberal values outside the sphere of the developed west, restricting them to domestic jurisdictions.

The Principles of Just War Theory; and the United Nations Charter:

St Thomas Aquinas (1225 –1274) first codified ‘just war’ in a theological grounding, and presented three conditions under which war can be deemed just ‘(a) it must be waged by a proper sovereign authority (b) there must be a just cause (c) the intentions must be pure, so that they intend to promote good and not private aggrandizement’ (cited in Evans & Newnham, 1998: 288).  The condition ‘that the cause must be just’ was so ambiguous that it essentially gave carte blanche to any political authority in Europe to go to war as often and with as much vigour for whatever represented in their view a ‘just cause’, something that has continued through the ambitions of tyrants to this day.

The theological groundings of Just War remained the basis for legitimacy until Hugo Grotius published his 1625 work ‘De Jure Belli ac Paci.’  (Evans & Newnham, 1998: 288)  This took the theological justifications of war and moved them aside asserting a secular and modern definition of just war.  Grotius stated that a ‘just war’ can only be fought under one of the following conditions ‘(a) self-defence (b) to enforce rights; (c) to seek reparations for injury and: (d) to punish a wrong-doer’ (Evans & Newnham, 1998: 288).  However, like the conditions set by St Thomas Aquinas, points (b) and (d) of the Grotian doctrine are also open to interpretation.  Iran saw the ‘wrong-doer’ as the United States, and declared a jihad against Americans everywhere, while President Reagan called the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’ and argued the just cause of placing thermonuclear warheads in space to deter Soviet ‘aggression’.

Therefore, particularly to realists, ‘just war’ doctrine, like cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian intervention, is considered dangerous and open to exploitation.  Just War in particular is criticised for setting conditions on war while at the same time leaving enough ambiguity to justify almost any action short of genocide, and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians.  Mary Kaldor argues that ‘There is a thin dividing line between socially acceptable killing and what is ostracised by society.’  (Kaldor, 2001: 17)  Grotian doctrine on just war does not clearly define where this line should be drawn.

Grotian theory ties the concept of war with the defence or enforcement of rights, which is the basis of cosmopolitan arguments, although Grotius used the term to mean the right to property, or territory, the establishment within political thought of rights beyond the material is well founded.  The American Declaration of Independence (1776) speaks of the ‘Right to life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness’, and earlier still is the Hobbesian defence of the divine right of Kings.  The defence of rights is central to cosmopolitan critique in arguing that the defence of human rights is as legitimate as defending a state’s rights.

Grotian doctrine split ‘just war’ into two distinct categories ‘jus ad bellum’ (lit the law towards war) and ‘jus in bello’ (lit. the law in war) (Brown, 2002: 103), it is from these two categories that the modern legal structure of war is defined.  This distinction emerged at a time in Europe that was experiencing the decline of the feudal system and the emergence of the modern nation state.  The legal sanctioning of war under papal and theological authority was losing its legitimacy and power within the emerging state system.  The shift from dynastic ambition to state based interests as the primary drive of international relations driven by the politicians of the day seized upon the Grotian concept of laws in war to regulate the ‘standing armies under the control of the state … [which are]… an integral part of the monopolization of legitimate violence…intrinsic to the modern state’ (Kaldor, 2001: 17) this provided the means by which states could pursue their interests and secure their territorial claims.

Martin Van Crevald argues that ‘to distinguish war from mere crime, it was defined as something waged by sovereign states alone.  Soldiers were defined as personnel licensed to engage in armed violence on behalf of the state…To obtain and maintain their license, soldiers had to be carefully registered, marked and controlled to the exclusion of privateering.  They were supposed to fight only when in uniform, carrying their arms ‘openly’ and obeying a commander who could be held responsible for their actions.  They were not supposed to resort to ‘dastardly’ methods such as violating truces, taking up arms again after they had been taken prisoner, and the like.  The civilian population was supposed to be left alone, ‘military necessity’ permitting.’  (Cited in Kaldor, 2001: 17-18)

The later point made by Van Crevald on the neutrality of civilians only when ‘military necessity permits’ is where Grotian doctrines of war diverge from those of cosmopolitanism over the position of civilians within a combat zone.  Cosmopolitan arguments on the conduct of war regard the preservation of civilian life as a key military necessity; one that can only be ignored were the cost of inaction would be greater than that of action.

The Grotian split in Just War theory had the effect of emphasising ‘jus in bello’ over ‘jus ad bellum’ within international law, for example the Hague (1901) and Geneva (1926,1946) Conventions regard exclusively the conduct of states within war, and not the conditions under which war can be declared.  For example, the International Organisation of the Red Cross only intercedes to assist combatants within war, and does not have the authority to assist civilian populations within nation states.  The mass deportation of Jews during World War Two to concentration camps in Germany and Eastern Europe was conducted with the awareness of the Red Cross; however, the activities of the SS in the death camps lay outside the organisations remit.

This emphasis on the conduct of combatants in war and not on the basis of its declaration, or the status of civilians has persisted to this day, with their being only one major legal framework for the declaration of a just war.  Article 2 of the United Nations (UN) Charter states that ‘prohibition on the use of force is qualified by two exemptions (1) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the face of an armed attack, preserved by Article 51; and (2) action taken for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security authorized by the UN Security Council under Article 42’ (cited in Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen & Gray, 2002: 56).

The central criticism of the prescriptions of just war as defined by Article 2 of the UN Charter is that it lacks morality.  Unlike cosmopolitan arguments, it leaves the interpretation of the doctrine open to political expediency, and the situation of non-combatants to warring parties.  The ability to apply the doctrine to a multitude of circumstances, while at the same time denying intervention on humanitarian grounds, means that ‘Just War’ doctrine can be viewed as crude, out dated and easily exploitable.  Crude in the sense that its prescriptions on the conditions under which war can be declared are no longer applicable in the developed world during the nuclear age, with its threat of mass indiscriminate slaughter; a just war between the United States and Russia is impossible due to the premise of mutually assured destruction.  In as much as the doctrine is applicable by the developed world in the developing world; e.g. the UNITAF Mission to Somalia, the chance of conflict of this nature is limited, and a wider human rights based doctrine would provide more effective responses in these situations, than seeking legal loopholes for intervention to end civil war, genocide or terrorism.

The fact that the principles upon which the United Nations stands in regard to the legitimacy of military action can be found in Just War Theory is a relevant factor within the argument over the legitimacy of cosmopolitan prescriptions for war.  Just War theory states the need for a legitimising sovereign authority, action in self-defence or the punishment of a wrong-doer for it to be enacted.  The Security Council can be seen as a sovereign authority and self-defence is as already pointed out protected within the UN charter.  The punishment of a wrong doer can be viewed within this setting through UN sanctions and the use of military force when they are ignored or breached, as in Iraq throughout the 1990’s.

The legal doctrines of the United Nations for legitimising military action prohibit such action in all but the most extreme cases, self-defence (Article 51).  Where the UN has sought to deal with humanitarian crises or the threat of international terrorism it has had to bend the Charter to almost breaking point.  In Kosovo and Somalia  ‘the theory supporting…[the]…actions was that some internal wars, at least when accompanied by war crimes, and massive human rights violations and other crimes against humanity even if unrelated to war, may threaten international peace and security and therefore were within the jurisdiction and were the responsibility of the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter’ (Reisman 1999) This use of Articles 34, 35 & 36 as a basis for military action under Article 42, is a demonstration of the need in international law for a humanitarian prescription for war.

An Example of a Just War, The Second Gulf War:

If any War can be deemed ‘Just’ under international law, then the Second Gulf War is probably the best example of such a conflict.  The basic background to it is as follows; on the 2nd August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, and annexed the territory, the United Nations Security Council on the same day responded by calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

In November 1990 the ‘Security Council passed Resolution 678, which authorised military action against Iraq if it had failed to withdraw from Kuwait [by midnight on the] 15th January 1991’ (Gilbert, 1999: 713).  An international coalition force was assembled and sent to the Gulf.  On the 16th January 1991 with the coming into force of resolution 678, Operation Desert Storm commenced, it was swift and decisive leading to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces on the 26th February.  Two days later on the 28th February coalition forces entered Kuwait City and declared Kuwait liberated, while later the same day ‘Tariq Aziz Iraqi Vice-President agreed to rescind Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait’ (Gilbert, 1999: 718).

The Second Gulf War is a ‘just war’ because it complied with both Grotian doctrine and international law through Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which gives every state the right to act in self-defence either alone or collectively.  The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq represented an aggressive armed attack, and the UN coalition force that was assembled to restore Kuwait’s national integrity corresponds to the ‘collective defence’ of Kuwait.  The Second Gulf War was both legally and morally legitimate, it was conducted to liberate an occupied nation, but it was not a Cosmopolitan War.

The war was not based on the restoration or enforcement of human rights; it was based on the principles of state sovereignty and the interests of the international community.  At the heart of the conflict lay the question of access to oil and the balance of power in the Middle East, a cosmopolitan war would not have allowed the repression of the Kurds following Saddam Hussein’s defeat.  If this war had been fought on cosmopolitan principles the Corpus Belli would have been different, it would not have allowed Saddam’s continuing rule, or the restoration of the ‘al Sabah’ (Milton-Edwards, 2003: 89) monarchy to its previous role as the overlords of Kuwait.

An Example of a Cosmopolitan War; NATO in Kosovo:

This analysis of the Kosovo War will provide an example of a conflict fought along the prescriptions of moral cosmopolitanism, a war fought for the protection of Human Rights, and their enforcement as a norm of international relations.  Kosovo provides a template for comparison between its institutionalised multilateral approach to humanitarian war fighting, and the more aggressive pragmatic approach argued for in this essay.

The NATO campaign in Kosovo was primarily the result of the enduring legacy of the Yugoslav wars of succession.  Within the minds of European and North American political leaders was the spectre of another bloodbath in the Balkans, coupled with a legacy of guilt for allowing the earlier brutal conflict to continue under their noses.  ‘It was the sense of guilt over the long agonies of the siege of Sarajevo, together with the speedy ending of the war once the West did intervene, which so powerfully fuelled the resolve to stop its repetition.’  (Hastings 2001)

The role of NATO in the post-cold war landscape of European defence was also in question, Bill Clinton stated in his speech to the American people on the eve of war that “Our mission is clear: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose,”…Failing to act, he added, “would discredit NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for fifty years now.”  (Cited in Klare, 1999)  Kosovo offered the alliance the opportunity to extend its remit, and reaffirm the role of the United States at the heart of European defence; highlighting European military inadequacies in technology and logistics.

As Brendan Simms states in the opening paragraph of his book ‘Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia’ ‘Between April 1992 and October 1995 a European country was destroyed.  Tens of thousands of its inhabitants were murdered.  More than a million were expelled, deported, or fled in fear of their lives.  An unknown number were raped, humiliated, and traumatized.  Bosnians of all ethnic origins – Muslim, Serb, and Croat – both suffered and inflicted suffering as the war dragged on.’  (Simms, 2002: XV)  It is the inaction that accompanied European responses to this conflict that led to a change in foreign policy objectives within European governments, brought about by the success of left of centre political parties during the mid-1990s.  ‘It is unquestionably the case that British foreign policy changed significantly when Labour replaced the Conservatives.  Up to that point British policy…had been steadily anti-interventionist.  If this had not been so, it is likely that there would have been a military intervention in Bosnia, or at least a raising of the arms embargo, long before the summer of 1995.  No one can doubt that Tony Blair was the leading interventionist in regard to Kosovo…Blair was even making preparations to commit 50,000 British soldiers to a land invasion, which would probably have gone ahead if Milosevic had not capitulated.  ’  (Hastings 2001) This change led to cohesion of thought on what Mary Kaldor calls ‘New Wars’ or humanitarian intervention between Europe and the United States.

When conflict in the Balkans flared up again during the summer of 1998 in the province of Kosovo, between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the forces of the Federal Yugoslav Republic (FYR), over the status of the province the international community reacted with universal condemnation of the tactics reportedly being used by Serbian forces against the Albanian secessionists.  Several attempts were made during that summer which concluded with the agreement to a cease-fire and further talks.  Unarmed monitors from the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were sent into Kosovo to monitor the cease-fire and ensure its implementation.

However, during the early months of 1999 it became increasingly clear that Serbia was not prepared to reach a compromise with the KLA and that further military action was being planned.  ‘On January 16th 1999 the bodies of forty five ethnic Albanians were discovered [by KLA fighters] just outside the village of Racak…The Racak villagers had been murdered by Serbs.  The victims, including three women and a child, had been mutilated.  One man, of about sixty-five had been decapitated’ (Gilbert, 1999: 897) The American head of the OSCE monitoring team in Kosovo William Walker, was seen on television sets across the world visiting the scene of the massacre, he was visibly shaken and commented when asked about the perpetrators of the crime that ‘I do not hesitate to accuse the government security forces.’  (Gilbert, 1999: 897)  Following failed peace talks at Rambouilliet outside Paris between representatives of the KLA and the Yugoslav government, and with the pace of population expulsion in the region increasing NATO decided to act.  On March 24th 1999, Operation Deliberate Force began with air strikes against military targets throughout Kosovo and Serbia.

Kosovo was a cosmopolitan war because NATO’s actions were not wholly premised on state interests, which Carl Von Clausewitz believed were the only rational reasons for such action, but in response to a humanitarian crisis evolving in the Balkans and a belief that genocide as witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda earlier in the decade was not going to be allowed to occur again.  It was in many ways the rediscovery of George Bush (Snr.) ‘New World Order’ which had stood at the beginning of that decade and been lost in the ethnic and civil conflicts that had been permitted to continue across the world since.  President Clinton stated at the time that the purpose of the war was ‘to stop the repression by the Serbs of the Kosovar Albanians’ (Gilbert, 1999: 905).

Ulrich Beck argues that from the legal position of non- interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of states ‘NATO’s response to Kosovo is a clear breach of international law’.  (Beck 2000: 82)  However, he argues that the attempts to stop the genocide expose the tension between human rights and national sovereignty.  Further arguing that Kosovo was an example that ‘The principle that international law proceeds human rights which held during the (nation state) first age of modernity is being replaced by the principle of the (world society) second age of modernity, that human rights precedes international law.’  (Beck 2000: 83)

The Kosovo War was a cosmopolitan war fought on the basis that the violations of human rights being carried out by the Serbian government were illegitimate, it was the first multi-national humanitarian assistance force in history to ignore the basic principle of realist world politics that of the supremacy of sovereign integrity, the right for states to act as they pleased within their borders.  There was no Security Council resolution, and no legal grounding whatsoever for the action taken by NATO, it was a unilateral action, in response to a humanitarian crisis brought about by Serbian state policy.  Beck argues that ‘International law does admittedly contain rules concerning the international use of violence, and it also distinguishes between what is permitted and what is forbidden.  But it does so in an inadequate way because what is not examined is whether the state authorities themselves have a legitimate existence, or to be more precise whether they satisfy the Human Rights Charter and the demands arising from it.’  (Beck 2000: 82)

Michael Walzer argues in ‘Just and Unjust Wars’ that  ‘Against the enslavement or massacre of political opponents, national minorities, and religious sects, there may well be no help unless help comes from outside…when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.’  (Walzer, 2000: 101)  It is for these reasons that Kosovo was a cosmopolitan war, it was the first time that the sovereignty of the individual was held with higher regard by the international community than that of the state, and it deemed that the actions of this state had de-legitimised its rights to claim sovereign power over the Kosovar Albanians.

However, Operation Deliberate Force failed to achieve its prime objective, to prevent the ethnic cleansing and mass deportation of the civilian population.  NATO’s campaign failed here because of the structure of its military forces and the vulnerability of the political alliance.  NATO was not ready to commit ground forces to the operation, and through strategic incompetence and political spin made this intention publicly known, ‘Washington…remains determined not to send in ground troops to fight a war.’  (BBC News 17/05/1999)  As Clausewitz states ‘the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort made.’  (Clausewitz, 1997: 13)  The political object of the Kosovo war was confused from the start, with parts of the alliance, Britain most notably, pushing for a complete military solution, through a ground invasion of Kosovo.  While others, the Americans and French calling for a limited air campaign followed by a peacekeeping force after a Serb withdrawal.  In this confusion, NATO grossly overestimated the impact of demonstration bombing on Milosevic’s resilience, lengthening the war, and falling to stop the ethnic cleansing.

The problem with Kosovo as a cosmopolitan war is that despite being morally right, the preservation of human rights, the refusal to accept the doctrine of sovereign integrity and the principle this supports of non-intervention.  The alliance that undertook the conflict did not agree how much ‘effort’ (Clausewitz, 1997: 13) was to be put to this end.  ‘…NATO did not drop food supplies for the thousands of Kosovars displaced from their homes…  [Because of]…the fear of flying below 15,000 ft which would have put its pilots at risk…instead it leased the operation to a consortium of NGOs.’  (Coker, 2003: 128)  Tony Blair said on April 21st 1999 that ‘We should have no hesitation and every resolve to see the thing through to the end.’  (Gilbert, 1999: 907)  NATO did, but in a way that allowed Milosevic to continue his reign of terror for a further three months, during which an accelerated programme of ethnic cleansing in the province caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to pour into Macedonia; adding a new humanitarian crisis to the one already present in Kosovo.

 Conclusion:

This essay has provided an overview to the conditions under which military action has been defined as legitimate and provided a context to the concept of prescriptive war, and the origins of legal prescriptions of war within just war theory.  The purpose of this essay has been to present an argument in favour of cosmopolitan justifications of war on human rights grounds as equally legitimate as those of just war.

We have seen that a just war can be fought without it being a cosmopolitan war.  The Second Gulf War was fought in order to re-establish the sovereignty of Kuwait and not for humanitarian or democratic principles, as Kuwait is and remains an absolute monarchy.  In the months following the war, the allied forces ignored the brutal suppression of a Shi’ite rebellion in the south of Iraq and an exodus of Kurds in the north.  Intervention in either of these two events would have represented a cosmopolitan action, however as the war was essentially one of traditional state interest, concerned with oil, and power in the Middle East it was just but not cosmopolitan.  Kosovo was a cosmopolitan war; it was premised on the spectre of genocide and fought to prevent a humanitarian crisis.  However NATO did not stop Milosevic it only hindered him, ten thousand Kosovar Albanians died as a result of ethnic cleansing after the onset of the war

The prescriptive conditions of legal warfare within the United Nations system have become restrictive against the endeavour of enforcing the right of the individual to physical security and freedom.  The obsessive concentration on legality and multilateralism has led to an obstruction on the morality of action or inaction within international politics.  This has left only extra judicial means of enforcing cosmopolitan norms, such as in Kosovo, which are rare examples of liberal democracies having the courage of their convictions to stand up for the norms of western civilisation. 

References:

Archibugi, Daniele (2003) Cosmopolitical Democracy, Ed. Daniele Archibugi, Debating Cosmopolitics, Verso, London, pp.10

Baylis, John, and Wirtz, James (2002) Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.56

BBC News Online (17/05/1999) Nato ‘must use troops’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/345484.stm

Beck, Ulrich (2000) The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology of the second age of modernity, British Journal of Sociology, Vol.51, Issue No.1 (January/March 2000) London School of Economics, pp.82, pp.83

Booth, Ken, and Smith, Steve (1995) International Relations Theory Today Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.111

Brown, Chris (2002) Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, International Political Theory Today Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.103

Clausewitz, Carl Von (1997) On War Wordsworth Editions, Ware, Hertfordshire, Great Britain, pp.13

Coker, Christopher (2003) Humane Warfare Routledge, London, pp.128

Evans, Graham, and Newnham, Jeffrey (1998) The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations Penguin Books, London, pp.288-289

Gilbert, Martin (1999) A History of the Twentieth Century, Volume 3: 1952 – 1999 Challenge to Civilisation HarperCollins, Bath, pp.713, pp.718, pp.895, pp.897, pp.905, pp.907

Hastings, Andrew (June-October 2001) Chomsky and Kosovo Book Review; Not a book about Kosovo Bosnia Report, Bosnia Institute, New Series No: 23/24/25, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=802&reportid=151

Hutchings, Kimberley (1999) International Relations Theory Today Sage, London pp35, pp.41

Kaldor, Mary (2001) New & Old Wars; Organized Violence in a Global Era Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.17-18

Klare, Michael T. (1999) The Progressive Comment; Bill Clintons War The Progressive, http://www.progressive.org/comment9905.htm)

Lloyd, John, (14th April 2003) Why I can no longer write for the NS New Statesman, pp.23

Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2003) Contemporary Politics in the Middle East Polity Press, Cambridge, pp.89

Reisman, Michael W. (1999) Editorial Comments NATO’S KOSOVO INTERVENTION: Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention” the American Journal of International Law v.93, no.4, (October1999) http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm

Simms, Brendan (2002) Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia Penguin Books, London, pp.XV

Walzer, Michael (2000) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations Third Edition, Basic Books, New York, pp.101

Egypt Meet Your New Boss, Same as the Old Dictator

By Ian Howarth

Yesterday I asked whether what we were witnessing in Egypt was a democratic coup or a return of the old guard.  The removal of Egypt’s first democratically elected president in a military coup was clearly an anti-democratic action, but it could have possibly led to a more plural political settlement within an equally democratic structure.EGYPT-POLITICS-UNREST-ARMY

The events of today seem to suggest that this hoped for good outcome from a bad action is drifting further and further away.  The activities and statements of the new government in Cairo seem much more to be aimed at the reestablishment of the old order in Egypt.  The imposition of press controls, the arrest of hundreds of senior Muslim Brotherhood members and the talk of the need for a democratic process that

Egypt has been ruled by the military through sham democratic processes for most of its modern history.   Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak were all military dictators who hung up their uniforms and called themselves President so as to cloth themselves in constitutional legitimacy.  Mohamed Morsi for all his failings as a politician was freely and fairly elected the President of Egypt.  His presidency reflected the true will of the people.  However much he may have lost popular support, tanks should never be used to bring about change in a democratic system.  If the military government in Egypt seeks to manage an election so that only candidates to its own liking are allowed to contest the presidency then Egypt will no longer be a democracy.  It would be no different in its basic operation to the process of vetting presidential candidates in the Iranian electoral process by the Assembly of Experts headed by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.reflects the ‘true will of the people’, all seem to point to the creation of a military controlled sham democracy. Adly Mansour who was until this morning the President of the Supreme Court was sworn in today as the interim president.  His rise to power has been rapid, having only been appointed to the Supreme Court in May.  This attempt at constitutionality seems to be little more than an attempt at legitimising a military coup. I would imagine that the vast majority of the real decisions in Egypt tonight continue to be made in the Defence Ministry and not the Presidential Palace.

While ‘managed democracy’ as it is sometimes called by the cronies that benefit from this corrupt system may offer a more stable Egypt; this will be stability bought at the cost of freedom through an oppressive, security state.  It was this oppressive system that was overthrown in January 2011.  I sincerely hope that we are not seeing its rebirth today.

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